Brutus, Letter One (Abridged)
18 October 1787
To the Citizens of the State of New-York
When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in whichnot only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but uponwhich the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great measuresuspended, the benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interestedin the result.
We have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these United-States areheld together, and the want of sufficient energy inour present confederation, to manage, in some instances, our general concerns.Various expedients have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none havesucceeded. At length a Convention of the states has been assembled, they haveformed a constitution which will now, probably, be submitted to the people toratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power, to whom alone it of rightbelongs to make or unmake constitutions, or forms of government, at theirpleasure. The most important question that was ever proposed to your decision,or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you, and you are todecide upon it by men of your own election, chosen specially for this purpose.If the constitution, offered to your acceptance, be a wise one, calculated topreserve the invaluable blessings of liberty, to secure the inestimable rightsof mankind, and promote human happiness, then, if you accept it, you will lay alasting foundation of happiness for millions yet unborn; generations to comewill rise up and call you blessed. You may rejoice in the prospects of thisvast extended continent becoming filled with freemen, who will assert thedignity of human nature. You may solace yourselves with the idea, that society, in this favoured land,will fast advance to the highest point of perfection; the human mind willexpand in knowledge and virtue, and the golden age be, in some measure, realised. But if, on the other hand, this form ofgovernment contains principles that will lead to the subversion of liberty— if it tends to establish a despotism, or, what is worse, a tyrannic aristocracy; then, if you adopt it, this onlyremaining assylum for liberty will be shut up, andposterity will execrate your memory.
It is insisted, indeed, that this constitution must be received, be it everso imperfect. If it has its defects, it is said, they can be best amended whenthey are experienced. But remember, when the people once part with power, theycan seldom or never resume it again but by force. Many instances can beproduced in which the people have voluntarily increased the powers of theirrulers; but few, if any, in which rulers have willingly abridged theirauthority. This is a sufficient reason to induce you to be careful, in thefirst instance, how you deposit the powers of government.
With these few introductory remarks, I shall proceed to a consideration ofthis constitution:
The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether aconfederated government be the best for the
This government is to possess absolute and uncontroulablepower, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object towhich it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it isdeclared "that the Congress shall have power to make all laws which shallbe necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, andall other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the UnitedStates; or in any department or office thereof." And by the 6th article,it is declared "that this constitution, and the laws of the United States,which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or which shallbe made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law ofthe land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing inthe constitution, or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Itappears from these articles that there is no need of any intervention of thestate governments, between the Congress and the people, to execute any onepower vested in the general government, and that the constitution and laws ofevery state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall beinconsistent with this constitution, or the laws made in pursuance of it, orwith treaties made under the authority of the United States. — Thegovernment then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not aconfederation. It is as much one complete government as that of New-York orMassachusetts, has as absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws,to appoint officers, institute courts, declare offences, and annex penalties,with respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the world. Sofar therefore as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up andlost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speakmore properly, some small degree of power is still left to the states, but alittle attention to the powers vested in the general government, will convinceevery candid man, that if it is capable of being executed, all that is reservedfor the individual states must very soon be annihilated, except so far as theyare barely necessary to the organization of the general government … It has authority to make lawswhich will affect the lives, the liberty, and property of every man in theUnited States; nor can the constitution or laws of any state, in any wayprevent or impede the full and complete execution of every power given. Thelegislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;— there is no limitation to this power, unless it be said that the clausewhich directs the use to which those taxes, and duties shall be applied, may besaid to be a limitation: but this is no restriction of the power at all, for bythis clause they are to be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States … Nostate legislature, or any power in the state governments, have any more to doin carrying this into effect, than the authority of one state has to do withthat of another. In the business therefore of laying and collecting taxes, theidea of confederation is totally lost, and that of one entire republic isembraced. It is proper here to remark, that the authority to lay and collecttaxes is the most important of any power that can be granted; it connects withit almost all other powers, or at least will in process of time draw all otherafter it; it is the great mean of protection, security, and defence,in a good government, and the great engine of oppression and tyranny in a badone …
The judicial power of the
How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article may operate to doaway all idea of confederated states, and to effect an entire consolidation ofthe whole into one general government, it is impossible to say. The powersgiven by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive aconstruction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws,which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, allpowers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, orany department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite[indefinite?], and may, for ought I know, be exercised in a such manner asentirely to abolish the state legislatures. Suppose the legislature of a stateshould pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the statedebt, may the Congress repeal this law, because it may prevent the collectionof a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for thegeneral welfare of the
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be bestthe thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? Itis here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government weadopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure theliberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full,fair, and equal representation of the people. The question then will be,whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, ispracticable, and can be exercised over the whole
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men whohave ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall beconstrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country ofsuch immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the wholeUnited States. Among the many illustrious authorities whichmight be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two.The one is the baron de Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]. "It is natural to a republic tohave only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a largerepublic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation;there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interestof his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious,by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur onthe ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed toa thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. Ina small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood,and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and ofcourse are less protected." Of the same opinion is the marquis Beccarari.
History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extentof the
The territory of the
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people shouldbe similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing ofopinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually strivingagainst those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, andprevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply thisremark to the condition of the
In a republic of such vast extent as the United-States, the legislaturecannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. Itcannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition andwants of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it shouldhave sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases ofthis nature, that would be continually arising.
In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soonbecome above the controul of the people, and abusetheir power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. Thetrust committed to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of theUnited-States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troopsand navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoningoffences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power of expendingthem, with a number of other powers, must be lodged and exercised in everystate, in the hands of a few. When these are attended with great honor andemolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to interestmen to pursue them, and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing men,such men will be ever restless in their pursuit after them. They will use thepower, when they have acquired it, to the purposes of gratifying their owninterest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very large republic,to call them to account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse ofpower.
These are some of the reasons by which it appears,that a free republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent ofthese states. If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate thethirteen states into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted.
Brutus.
